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  • Jan 29th
  • Theresa J Morris 9:43 AMWho will be speakers for the FEBRUARY 2019? Talk to Ken Johnston and Rick Doty? TJ
  • Janet Lessin 10:42 AMYou may want to invite someone to present each month. We could use zoom to present to the world and have members join the meetup from around the globe.
  • Feb 2nd
  • Theresa J Morris 6:25 PMis group is for anyone interested in metaphysics, tarot readings, paranormal research, conscious awakening future events, life and death experiences, intellectual philosophical panel discussions, UFO research and investigations, spirituality growth, science and technology online communications, science fiction tv shows, super natural who want to meet other kindred spirits and authors of their own life story. We can show support and get support from friends we network inside our own spiritual science community.
  • Feb 3rd
  • Gloria Hawker 10:13 PMPlease post this onto “Comments” section on the Albuq. Meet Up group.  Thank you, Gloria
  • Feb 9th
  • Theresa J Morris 1:53 PMTheories · Behaviorism (Radical) · Biological naturalism · Cognitive psychology · Mind–body dualism · Eliminative materialism · Emergent materialism · Emergentism · Epiphenomenalism · Functionalism · Idealism · Interactionism · Materialism · Monism · Naïve realism · Neurophenomenology · Neutral monism · Occasionalism · Psychoanalysis · Parallelism · Phenomenalism · Phenomenology · Physicalism · identity theory · Property dualism · Representational · Solipsism · Substance dualism Concepts · Abstract object · Artificial intelligence · Chinese room · Cognition · Cognitive closure · Concept · Concept and object · Consciousness · Hard problem of consciousness · Hypostatic abstraction · Idea · Identity · Ingenuity · Intelligence · Intentionality · Introspection · Intuition · Language of thought · Materialism · Mental event · Mental image · Mental process · Mental property · Mental representation · Mind · Mind–body problem · Non-physical entity · New mysterianism · Pain · Privileged access · Problem of other minds · Propositional attitude · Qualia · Tabula rasa · Understanding · Zombie · more… Related topics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of artificial intelligence / information / perception / self Jump to navigationJump to search This article is about the philosophical concept. For other uses, see Qualia (disambiguation). In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning “of what sort” or “of what kind” in a specific instance like “what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now”. Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to “propositional attitudes”,[1] where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett once suggested that qualia was “an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us”.[2] Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remains controversial due to qualia not being a pragmatically verifiable matter. Contents · 1Definitions · 2Arguments for the existence o 2.1″What’s it like to be?” argument o 2.2Inverted spectrum argument o 2.3Zombie argument o 2.4Explanatory gap argument o 2.5Knowledge argument · 3Critics of qualia o 3.1Daniel Dennett o 3.2Paul Churchland o 3.3Gary Drescher o 3.4David Lewis o 3.5Marvin Minsky o 3.6Michael Tye · 4Proponents of qualia o 4.1David Chalmers o 4.2E. J. Lowe o 4.3J. B. Maund o 4.4Moreland Perkins o 4.5Ramachandran and Hirstein o 4.6Howard Robinson and William Robinson o 4.7Edmond Wright o 4.8Erwin Schrödinger · 5Neurobiological blending of perspectives o 5.1Rodolfo Llinás o 5.2Roger Orpwood · 6Other issues o 6.1Indeterminacy o 6.2Causal efficacy o 6.3Epistemological issues · 7See also · 8Notes · 9References · 10Further reading · 11External links Definitions https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/25/Red.svg/150px-Red.svg.png Saturated colors are a commonly used example of a quale. There are many definitions of qualia, which have changed over time. One of the simpler, broader definitions is: “The ‘what it is like’ character of mental states. The way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a rose, etc.”[3] Clarence Irving Lewis, in his book Mind and the World Order (1929), was the first to use the term “qualia” in its generally agreed upon modern sense. There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these “qualia.” But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective.[citation needed] Frank Jackson (1982) later defined qualia as “…certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes” (p. 273).[page needed] Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.[4] According to these, qualia are: 1. ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any other means than direct experience. 2. intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience’s relation to other things. 3. private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible. 4. directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale. If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as “red looks hot”, or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as “it’s the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you”, supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete description of the experience.[citation needed] Another way of defining qualia is as “raw feels”. A raw feel is a perception in and of itself, considered entirely in isolation from any effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition. In contrast, a cooked feel is that perception seen as existing in terms of its effects. For example, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineffable, raw feel, while the experience of warmth or bitterness caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. Cooked feels are not qualia.[citation needed] According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in his paper “Identity and Necessity” (1971), one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels can be meaningfully discussed—that qualia exist—is that it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking qualia. While very few ever claim that such an entity, called a philosophical zombie, actually exists, the mere possibility is claimed to be sufficient to refute physicalism.[citation needed] Arguments for the existence See also: Hard problem of consciousness Since it is by definition impossible to convey qualia verbally, it is also impossible to demonstrate them directly in an argument; so a more tangential approach is needed. Arguments for qualia generally come in the form of thought experiments designed to lead one to the conclusion that qualia exist.[citation needed] “What’s it like to be?” argument Main article: Subjective character of experience Although it does not actually mention the word “qualia”, Thomas Nagel’s paper “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?”[5] is often cited in debates over qualia. Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective character, a what-it-is-like aspect. He states that “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.”[6] Nagel also suggests that the subjective aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by the objective methods of reductionistic science. He claims that “if we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done.”[7] Furthermore, he states that “it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective.”[7] Inverted spectrum argument Main article: Inverted spectrum https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg/250px-Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg Inverted qualia The inverted spectrum thought experiment, originally developed by John Locke,[8] invites us to imagine that we wake up one morning and find that for some unknown reason all the colors in the world have been inverted. Furthermore, we discover that no physical changes have occurred in our brains or bodies that would explain this phenomenon. Supporters of the existence of qualia argue that since we can imagine this happening without contradiction, it follows that we are imagining a change in a property that determines the way things look to us, but that has no physical basis.[9][10] In more detail: 1. Metaphysical identity holds of necessity. 2. If something is possibly false, it is not necessary. 3. It is conceivable that qualia could have a different relationship to physical brain-states. 4. If it is conceivable, then it is possible. 5. Since it is possible for qualia to have a different relationship with physical brain-states, they cannot be identical to brain states (by 1). 6. Therefore, qualia are non-physical. The argument thus claims that if we find the inverted spectrum plausible, we must admit that qualia exist (and are non-physical). Some philosophers find it absurd that an armchair argument can prove something to exist, and the detailed argument does involve a lot of assumptions about conceivability and possibility, which are open to criticism. Perhaps it is not possible for a given brain state to produce anything other than a given quale in our universe, and that is all that matters. The idea that an inverted spectrum would be undetectable in practice is also open to criticism on more scientific grounds (see main article).[9][10] There is an actual experiment—albeit somewhat obscure—that parallels the inverted spectrum argument. George M. Stratton, professor of psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, performed an experiment in which he wore special prism glasses that caused the external world to appear upside down.[11][12] After a few days of continually wearing the glasses, an adaptation occurred and the external world appeared righted. When the glasses were removed, the external world again appeared inverted. After a similar period, perception of the external world returned to the “normal” perceptual state. If this argument provides indicia that qualia exist, it does not necessarily follow that they must be non-physical, because that distinction should be considered a separate epistemological issue. Zombie argument Main article: Philosophical zombie A similar argument holds that it is conceivable (or not inconceivable) that there could be physical duplicates of people, called “philosophical zombies”, without any qualia at all. These “zombies” would demonstrate outward behavior precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a subjective phenomenology. It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility of philosophical zombies is that there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give rise to qualia—the zombie can only exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the physical brain.[citation needed] Explanatory gap argument Main article: Explanatory gap Joseph Levine’s paper Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap takes up where the criticisms of conceivability arguments, such as the inverted spectrum argument and the zombie argument, leave off. Levine agrees that conceivability is flawed as a means of establishing metaphysical realities, but points out that even if we come to the metaphysicalconclusion that qualia are physical, there is still an explanatory problem. While I think this materialist response is right in the end, it does not suffice to put the mind-body problem to rest. Even if conceivability considerations do not establish that the mind is in fact distinct from the body, or that mental properties are metaphysically irreducible to physical properties, still they do demonstrate that we lack an explanation of the mental in terms of the physical. However, such an epistemological or explanatory problem might indicate an underlying metaphysical issue—the non-physicality of qualia, even if not proven by conceivability arguments is far from ruled out. In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn’t demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former.[13] Knowledge argument Main article: Knowledge argument In the article “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982),[14] Frank Jackson offers what he calls the “knowledge argument” for qualia. One example runs as follows: Mary the color scientist knows all the physical facts about color, including every physical fact about the experience of color in other people, from the behavior a particular color is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a color has been seen. However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be admitted that she learns something about the color red the first time she sees it — specifically, she learns what it is like to see that color. This thought experiment has two purposes. First, it is intended to show that qualia exist. If one agrees with the thought experiment, we believe that Mary gains something after she leaves the room—that she acquires knowledge of a particular thing that she did not possess before. That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red, and it must thus be conceded that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to a particular quale and one who does not. The second purpose of this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind. Specifically, the knowledge argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical truths. The challenge posed to physicalism by the knowledge argument runs as follows: 1. Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about color experiences of other people. 2. After her release, Mary learns something about the color experiences of other people. Therefore, 3. Before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people’s color experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information. Therefore, 4. There are truths about other people’s color experience that are not physical. Therefore, 5. Physicalism is false. First Jackson argued that qualia are epiphenomenal: not causally efficacious with respect to the physical world. Jackson does not give a positive justification for this claim—rather, he seems to assert it simply because it defends qualia against the classic problem of dualism. Our[who?] natural assumption would be that qualia must be causally efficacious in the physical world, but some would ask how we[who?] could argue for their existence if they did not affect our brains. If qualia are to be non-physical properties (which they must be in order to constitute an argument against physicalism), some argue that it is almost impossible to imagine how they could have a causal effect on the physical world. By redefining qualia as epiphenomenal, Jackson attempts to protect them from the demand of playing a causal role. Later, however, he rejected epiphenomenalism. This, he argues, is because when Mary first sees red, she says “wow”, so it must be Mary’s qualia that cause her to say “wow”. This contradicts epiphenomenalism. Since the Mary’s room thought experiment seems to create this contradiction, there must be something wrong with it. This is often referred to as the “there must be a reply” reply. Critics of qualia Daniel Dennetthttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/21/Daniel_dennett_Oct2008.JPG/220px-Daniel_dennett_Oct2008.JPG Daniel Dennett In Consciousness Explained (1991) and “Quining Qualia” (1988),[15] Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that demonstrates that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, which he calls “intuition pumps”, he brings qualia into the world of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. His argument shows that, once the concept of qualia is so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special properties defined for qualia. In Dennett’s updated version of the inverted spectrum thought experiment, “alternative neurosurgery”, you again awake to find that your qualia have been inverted—grass appears red, the sky appears orange, etc. According to the original account, you should be immediately aware that something has gone horribly wrong. Dennett argues, however, that it is impossible to know whether the diabolical neurosurgeons have indeed inverted your qualia (by tampering with your optic nerve, say), or have simply inverted your connection to memories of past qualia. Since both operations would produce the same result, you would have no means on your own to tell which operation has actually been conducted, and you are thus in the odd position of not knowing whether there has been a change in your “immediately apprehensible” qualia. Dennett’s argument revolves around the central objection that, for qualia to be taken seriously as a component of experience—for them to even make sense as a discrete concept—it must be possible to show that a) it is possible to know that a change in qualia has occurred, as opposed to a change in something else; or that b) there is a difference between having a change in qualia and not having one. Dennett attempts to show that we cannot satisfy (a) either through introspection or through observation, and that qualia’s very definition undermines its chances of satisfying (b). Supporters of qualia could point out that in order for you to notice a change in qualia, you must compare your current qualia with your memories of past qualia. Arguably, such a comparison would involve immediate apprehension of your current qualia and your memories of past qualia, but not the past qualia themselves. Furthermore, modern functional brain imaging has increasingly suggested that the memory of an experience is processed in similar ways and in similar zones of the brain as those originally involved in the original perception. This may mean that there would be asymmetry in outcomes between altering the mechanism of perception of qualia and altering their memories. If the diabolical neurosurgery altered the immediate perception of qualia, you might not even notice the inversion directly, since the brain zones which re-process the memories would themselves invert the qualia remembered. On the other hand, alteration of the qualia memories themselves would be processed without inversion, and thus you would perceive them as an inversion. Thus, you might know immediately if memory of your qualia had been altered, but might not know if immediate qualia were inverted or whether the diabolical neurosurgeons had done a sham procedure (Ungerleider, 1995). Dennett also has a response to the “Mary the color scientist” thought experiment. He argues that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red. Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew “everything about color”, that knowledge would include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the “quale” of color. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that the misleading aspect of the story is that Mary is supposed to not merely be knowledgeable about color but to actually know all the physical facts about it, which would be a knowledge so deep that it exceeds what can be imagined, and twists our intuitions. If Mary really does know everything physical there is to know about the experience of color, then this effectively grants her almost omniscient powers of knowledge. Using this, she will be able to deduce her own reaction, and figure out exactly what the experience of seeing red will feel like. Dennett finds that many people find it difficult to see this, so he uses the case of RoboMary to further illustrate what it would be like for Mary to possess such a vast knowledge of the physical workings of the human brain and color vision. RoboMary is an intelligent robot who, instead of the ordinary color camera-eyes, has a software lock such that she is only able to perceive black and white and shades in-between. RoboMary can examine the computer brain of similar non-color-locked robots when they look at a red tomato, and see exactly how they react and what kinds of impulses occur. RoboMary can also construct a simulation of her own brain, unlock the simulation’s color-lock and, with reference to the other robots, simulate exactly how this simulation of herself reacts to seeing a red tomato. RoboMary naturally has control over all of her internal states except for the color-lock. With the knowledge of her simulation’s internal states upon seeing a red tomato, RoboMary can put her own internal states directly into the states they would be in upon seeing a red tomato. In this way, without ever seeing a red tomato through her cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see a red tomato. Dennett uses this example to show us that Mary’s all-encompassing physical knowledge makes her own internal states as transparent as those of a robot or computer, and it is almost straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red. Perhaps Mary’s failure to learn exactly what seeing red feels like is simply a failure of language, or a failure of our ability to describe experiences. An alien race with a different method of communication or description might be perfectly able to teach their version of Mary exactly how seeing the color red would feel. Perhaps it is simply a uniquely human failing to communicate first-person experiences from a third-person perspective. Dennett suggests that the description might even be possible using English. He uses a simpler version of the Mary thought experiment to show how this might work. What if Mary was in a room without triangles and was prevented from seeing or making any triangles? An English-language description of just a few words would be sufficient for her to imagine what it is like to see a triangle—she can simply and directly visualize a triangle in her mind. Similarly, Dennett proposes, it is perfectly, logically possible that the quale of what it is like to see red could eventually be described in an English-language description of millions or billions of words. In “Are we explaining consciousness yet?” (2001), Dennett approves of an account of qualia defined as the deep, rich collection of individual neural responses that are too fine-grained for language to capture. For instance, a person might have an alarming reaction to yellow because of a yellow car that hit her previously, and someone else might have a nostalgic reaction to a comfort food. These effects are too individual-specific to be captured by English words. “If one dubs this inevitable residue qualia, then qualia are guaranteed to exist, but they are just more of the same, dispositional properties that have not yet been entered in the catalog […].”[16] Paul Churchland According to Paul Churchland, Mary might be considered to be like a feral child. Feral children have suffered extreme isolation during childhood. Technically when Mary leaves the room, she would not have the ability to see or know what the color red is. A brain has to learn and develop how to see colors. Patterns need to form in the V4 section of the visual cortex. These patterns are formed from exposure to wavelengths of light. This exposure is needed during the early stages of brain development. In Mary’s case, the identifications and categorizations of color will only be in respect to representations of black and white.[17] Gary Drescher In his book Good and Real (2006), Gary Drescher compares qualia with “gensyms” (generated symbols) in Common Lisp. These are objects that Lisp treats as having no properties or components and which can only be identified as equal or not equal to other objects. Drescher explains, “we have no introspective access to whatever internal properties make the red gensym recognizably distinct from the green […] even though we know the sensation when we experience it.”[18] Under this interpretation of qualia, Drescher responds to the Mary thought experiment by noting that “knowing about red-related cognitive structures and the dispositions they engender—even if that knowledge were implausibly detailed and exhaustive—would not necessarily give someone who lacks prior color-experience the slightest clue whether the card now being shown is of the color called red.” This does not, however, imply that our experience of red is non-mechanical; “on the contrary, gensyms are a routine feature of computer-programming languages”.[19] David Lewis David Lewis has an argument that introduces a new hypothesis about types of knowledge and their transmission in qualia cases. Lewis agrees that Mary cannot learn what red looks like through her monochrome physicalist studies. But he proposes that this doesn’t matter. Learning transmits information, but experiencing qualia doesn’t transmit information; instead it communicates abilities. When Mary sees red, she doesn’t get any new information. She gains new abilities—now she can remember what red looks like, imagine what other red things might look like and recognize further instances of redness. Lewis states that Jackson’s thought experiment uses the “Phenomenal Information Hypothesis”—that is, the new knowledge that Mary gains upon seeing red is phenomenal information. Lewis then proposes a different “Ability Hypothesis” that differentiates between two types of knowledge: knowledge that (information) and knowledge how (abilities). Normally the two are entangled; ordinary learning is also an experience of the subject concerned, and people both learn information (for instance, that Freud was a psychologist) and gain ability (to recognize images of Freud). However, in the thought experiment, Mary can only use ordinary learning to gain know-that knowledge. She is prevented from using experience to gain the know-how knowledge that would allow her to remember, imagine and recognize the color red. We have the intuition that Mary has been deprived of some vital data to do with the experience of redness. It is also uncontroversial that some things cannot be learned inside the room; for example, we do not expect Mary to learn how to ski within the room. Lewis has articulated that information and ability are potentially different things. In this way, physicalism is still compatible with the conclusion that Mary gains new knowledge. It is also useful for considering other instances of qualia; “being a bat” is an ability, so it is know-how knowledge.[20] Marvin Minsky https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg/220px-Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg Marvin Minsky The artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky thinks the problems posed by qualia are essentially issues of complexity, or rather of mistaking complexity for simplicity. Now, a philosophical dualist might then complain: “You’ve described how hurting affects your mind—but you still can’t express how hurting feels.” This, I maintain, is a huge mistake—that attempt to reify “feeling” as an independent entity, with an essence that’s indescribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those
  • Mar 22nd
  • Theresa J Morris 12:19 AMhttps://youtu.be/ZakoK0keQdU
  • Hi Gloria – Yes – I am still in helping you. https://youtu.be/ZakoK0keQdU
  • Email me at tjmorrisageny@gmail.com okay. We will do a Remote Virtual Webinar or Seminar with you. https://youtu.be/ZakoK0keQdU
  • Mar 23rd
  • Gloria Hawker 12:40 PMHi Theresa!  Yes, I would like to hear what you have in mind especially getting ready for when covid is possibly not around anymore, and hope it will be soon!Contact me,Gloria
  • Apr 22nd
  • Theresa J Morris 8:08 PMACO American Communications Online Holding Company and TJ Morris Agency service company is coming together to assist others with the change in their life stories. We assist you while you hold the pen. “We are the authors of our own life stories.” channel dedicated to exploring history of humanity ancient cultures origin, world mysteries and unexplained spiritual science and supernatural events. Truthseekers are joining us daily on the internet and in social media. We share building cyberspace culture. Many of us still long for the outdoors and hospitality in our sacred travel sites. This requires leaving the comfort of belief behind. All material is intended for educational entertainment spiritual science conversations, and audio video only. Content may expand your levels of conscious thoughts and liberate your body-mind-soul. Question everything and also notice the synchronicities and serendipity behavior changes. a sense of wonderment the world changes as you do. Be, do, have, abundance of knowledge as wealth uniquality and physics 101 let there be just 1 – Pythagoras theory.
  • Managing Membership Not-For-Profit Association Ascension Cosmos Oracles Theresa J Morris <tjmorrisagency@gmail.com> 11:56 AM (3 minutes ago) to Richard, Dr, Ken, Janet, Marci, Melinda, SUZANNE, AztecIndigoMoon, Bret Dear Friends: We all have a purpose to share education, information, knowledge we have experienced and accumulated. We all want to be liked and accepted among our peers, friends, associates. I am doing my part in my companies as American Communications Online, Profit and Ascension Cosmos Oracles Corp Not-For-Profit in both words and deeds. Due to my lifestyle I could be considered a hermit, living alone with a dog and cat. The reason I am contacting you today, is to let you know I cherish our friendships. We each are an immortal being and spark of the divine. Welcome to all who join me in my quest of sharing who you are online in our own building of Cyberspace Culture Community. While I learn to offer my services to other developers in our internet communications, I find myself drawn to 2 types at this point. Developers and Writers. I am sharing this personal part of my life in MEET UP Online so you can know we all can share in our own group without paying a fee. However, I am offering membership to others at $5.00 a month in the future as listing their LINK – DOMAIN to ours online. But first, they must know me for a year and must allow me to vet them as to who they say they are and the business they represent to me personally. I find that this information building is crucial to us all moving forward in cooperation online. Your friend in word and deed. Theresa J Thurmond Morris Introduction Yogi lifer to life journey sharing a spiritual path in consciousness, alien life, and A.I. in cyberspace culture community building with American Communications Online Media, News, Publishing, Books, as Ascension Cosmos Oracles Corp Not-for-Profit. TJ Morris Agency d/b/a Theresa J Morris Ministries – A Table Deal – All Things Allowed By Law applicable. ACO American Communications Online Services (850) 736-1580 Psychic Medium TJ Morris Intuitive Insight Guidance ACO American Communications Online Services is our Holding Company. Theresa J Morris Ministries d/b/a TJ Morris Agency, ACIR, ACO, Ascension Cosmos Oracles Corp. Not For Profit to file 501 (c) 3 Church, Education, Tourism, All Things Allowed By Law. TJ Morris ET Radio Shows, YouTube Videos Broadcasting from Gulf Breeze, Florida 32563 – TJ Morris ET Radio YouTube Videos. Branding Social Media Publicity Writing Editing Public Relations Creative Writing Facebook Public Speaking Event Planning Press Releases Psychic Readings Home & Office Organizing Office Admin A Team Clean X ACO A Table Deal -All things allowed by law education TJ Morris Publishing American Communications Online TJ Morris ET Radio Shows – Live Recordings for your websites Website Host and Webmaster Office Calls-House Calls Cleaning Feng Shui & Reading Press Releases

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